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ACTIONS AGAINST NON-RESIDENTS AND ABSENTEES.
NEARLY all governments have found it necessary to authorize
their courts, in the administration of justice, to entertain jurisdiction to some extent over non-risidents and absentees from their
territory. A due regard for the -welfare of their own citizens,
whose rights of property or person, it is argued, should not be
impaired by the absence of persons who may be interested with,
or related to them, is offered, as a justification for the practice.
It is proposed in the present article, to ascertain the proper limits
within which such jurisdiction may be exercised. But before
entering upon the task, it is thought that a statement of the
different modes in which it has been asserted, may throw some
light upon the discussion. At least, it will show how extensively
the practice prevails; and in this fact -will be found an excuse
for the discussion, which otherwise might not be of much practical
importance.
In Indiana (2 vol. Stat. Ind. (1860), p. 64), California (Comp.
Laws Cal., p. 524, § 30 (1850-1853)), Kentucky (Stanton's Code
Pr. Ky., sec. 88, p. 52), and Maine (Rev. Stat. Maine, p. 499
(1857), J 24), actions at law may be maintained against nonresidents upon constructive service of process by publication or
such mode as the court may order. In Tennessee (Code of Tenn.,
1). 779 (1858)), Mississippi (Rev. Code Miss., p. 545 (1857)),
North Carolina (Rev. Code N. C., p. 188 (1854)), Vermont
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(Comp. Laws Vermont, p. 210 (1850)), Illinois (1 vol. Stat. Ill.,
p. 139 (1863)), Arkansas (Ark. Digest of Statutes, p. 227 (1846)),
and Colorado (Laws Colorado, p. 183 (1861-2)), suits in chancery
may be maintained against non-residents upon constructive service
of process by publication. Actions at law may be brought upon
like service of process in Minnesota (Stat. Min., p. 835 (1851)),
Kansas (Comp. Laws Kansas, p. 186, sec. 78 (1862)), Nebraska
(Laws Nebraska, p. 119 (1857-1859)), Iowa (Rev. Laws Iowa,
p. 501 (1860)), Ohio (2 Rev. Stat. 0., p. 964 (1860)), Wisconsin
Rev. Stat. Wis., p. 719 (1858)), and New York (Voorhies N. Y.
Code, p. 167, § 135 (1864)), where the defendant absconds or
withdraws himself from his usual place of abode, with the intent
to defraud his creditors or to evade the process of the court.
Reference is now had to actions in peroonam; but it is not to be
inferred that all the statutes cited authorize every form of such
action. According to the law of Scotland, suit might be instituted and judgment rendered against an absent subject having
heritable property in the kingdom. Service was effected by proclamation made by a messenger-at-arms at the market cross of
Edinburgh and the pier'and shore of Leith. On this mode of
service a judgment of horning might be rendered, which was exe.cuted in a writ giving authority to arrest and poirnd, also to
charge'the debtor to pay, and, in default of payment, to denounce
him as a rebel and put him to horn: Bell's Laws of Scotland
2396. The record of such a case will be seen in Douglass.v.
Forrest,where the validity of such a judgment was sustained in
the Court of Common Pleas'of England: -Douglassv. Forrest, 4
Bingham 686. The decision, however, may be regarded as
resting upon the statute of 54 Geo. 3, c. 187, in which this mode
of serving process was recognised, and not upon any principle of
international law. Under the French law the attorney-general is
charged with the duty of attending to the interests of absentees:
Code Civ'il, liv. 1, T. 4, cap. 1, art. 114. The notice of suit
:might be left with him, as representative of the absentee: Code
Pro. Civ. Partie 1, liv. 2, tit. 2, art. 69. A judgment rendered
upon this mode of service in one of the British islands where the
French law prevailed, was held valid in the courts of England:
Bequet v. McCarthy, 2 Barn. & Adol. 951. Under the Civil
Code of Louisiana, the court appoints curatoas to attend to the
interest of absent defendants, on whom citation may be served:
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Hill v. B,,ie'nmn 14 La. 4471 ; G,'ay v. Trafton, 11 Martin 246;
La. Civ. Code, art. 57 ; Code Prac. 116-194, 964.
Uu.ler the Admiralty Law of England, citation in proceedings
in pcr'onamo could be served by posting in the Royal Exchange:.
Story's Confi. Laws, sec. 546 (3d ed.). The warrant of seizure
in suits in rem was served, by taking possession of the property
and reading or producing the warrant to the persons in charge:
2 Browne's Civ. & Ad. Law 397-398. In the United States our
admiralty practice requires the marshal after seizure to give
public notice of the seizure and time of return of the writ, in such
newspaper in the district as the court shall direct: 2 Conk. Adm.
Pr., p. 152 (2d ed.).
Process at the common law had to be served upon the person
of the defendant. If he failed to appear in court, in obedience to
the verbal warning of the sheriff holding the original writ, writs
of attachment or pone issued from the court commanding the
sheriff to attach him by taking certain of his goods, which should
be forfeited if he did not appear. If after this he neglected to
appear, writs of distress issued from time to time till he was
stripped of his goods and the profits of his lands, which all became
forfeited to the king. Here the process ended in cases of injuries
without force, until the enactment of statutes which allowed a
capias for his person in actions of account, detinue, and case, in
like manner as it had before been used in actions for injuries
accompanied with force. If he could not be found upon the
return of this writ the suit was at an end: 3 B1. Com. 283-4.
The proceedings of outlawry which followed at the option of the
plaintiff, resulted in a general forfeiture of his property to the
king, from whom the plaintiff on petition to the Court of Exchequer or Lords of the Treasury could obtain the satisfaction
of his demand. But he was left without judgment on his claim,
and the satisfaction, of it was limited, of course, by the value of
the property found. In recurring to these requirements of the
old common law, we are more deeply impressed with the departure
from it, which is witnessed on every hand; having in our.daily
practice almost forgotten that our ancestors were in the habit of
seizing the defendant and putting him under arrest, before they
felt justified in entering a judgment against him.
Nearly the same strictness prevailed in the Court of Chancery
until the enactment of modern statutes. It vas a rule in equity
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that all persons legally or beneficially interested in the subjectmatter of a suit, should be made parties. But it was the practice
of the court to dispense with all persons over whom it did not
possess jurisdiction, if it could be done consistently with the
merits of the case, their absence being stated in the bill: Mitford's P1. p. 30. Justice was administered, as far as it could be,
to those within the jurisdiction. It was usual to state the name
of the absent party and pray process against him when he came
within the jurisdiction: Story's Eq. P1., sec. 78, 79. In the
reign of George the Second, the Court of Chancery was authorized
to commence and proceed to final judgment against a subject of
the kingdom, who had withdrawn or absconded from his usual
place of abode, for the purpose of evading process: 5 Geo. II.
cap. 25. Notice of the suit had to be inserted in the London
Gazette and posted in some public place at the Royal Exchange.
This statute was repealed by 11 Geo. IV. and 1 Will. IV. c. 36,
in which, however, the provisions relating to process by constructive notice were re-enacted: 11 Geo. IV. and 1 Will. IV.
c. 36. These'statutes have probably been the basis of the laws
authorizing service of process by publication in suits -in chancery
in the different states. In the state of Georgia, the 5 Geo. II.
cap. 25 was held to be in force as. a part of the English law
introduced into the colonies; but it was not regarded as applying
to non-residents who had not been inhabitants, absconding from,
or leaving, the state: Dearing v. Bank of Chzrleston, 5 Geo.
Rep. 497.
That the person or thing proceeded against must be within the
jurisdiction of the court entertaining the cause of action, seems
to be well settled as a general principle of international law.
As such it commands the assent of all the authorities cited in this
article, which in any way refer to it. The diversity of opinion
is encountered in fixing the qualifications and exceptions to it.
It will be found that some courts have gone so far in doing this,
as practically to deny the force and virtue of a general principle,
to which they have yielded their formal assent.
In respect to actions in the nature of proceedings in rem, there
is scarcely any controversy. To enforce any right of action
against property real or personal, it must be within the jurisdiction or possession of the tribunal assuming to give judgment
against it: Rose v. Himeley, 4 Cranch 241 ; Monroe v. Douglass,
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4 Sandf. Ch. 12M. It has been intimated by some judges, that a
notice of some sort, either actual or constructive, to persons interested in the property is necessary to an exercise of the jurisdiction: Cavan v. Stewart, 1 Starkie 525; Story's Confi. Laws,§ 592; Fisher v. Lane, 3 Wils. 302. In all the states and
governments to which reference has been made, notice is provided
for in some form or another. It is an easy thing to give, and a
prudent administration of justice would seem to require it. It
would be difficult to maintain, however, that a formal notice of
any kind was indispensable, or that our courts would be justified
in ignoring the record of a suit in rem which fails to show a.
notice, if it comes from a state or nation whose laws did not
require it. In compliance with the general principle already laid
down, which has its source in the comity of nations, such record
would be entitled to full faith and credit, unless impeached for
actual fraud; for the reason that the court had jurisdiction over
the thing proceeded against, and gave judgment according to the
laws of the land: Monroe v. -Douglass,4 Sandf. Ch. 126. In
many actions in rem, the levy upon, or seizure of, the property
answers the office of a notice. This is eminently so in admiralty
proceedings: Story's Confi. § 440; The Jerusalem, 2 Gall. 191;
.Hollingsworthv. Barbour, 4 Peters 466. The action of attachment according to the custom of London is entirely unprovided
with any kind of notice, either actual or constructive, except what
may be implied in the seizure of the property: Drake Attach.
§ 5 (2d edition) ; Kilburn v. Woodworth, 5 Johns. 37.
It may be remarked in passing, that many actions are of a twofold character. They have for their object the enforcement of
demands against both person and property. The common action
of attachment as it prevails in the United States is referred to as
one of them. So far as its proceedings terminate in a judgment
against the person of the defendant, they rest upon the same
ground with other actions in personam, and should disclose the
same kind of service of process. If they fail in this, the judgment will not be recognised in other jurisdictions as extending
beyond the property actually seized or levied upon: Spencer v.
Sloo, 8 La. 290; Fiske v. Anderson, 33 Barb. 71; Winston v.
Taylor, 28 Mo. 82 ; Steel v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447 ; Phelps v.
Halker, 1 Dall. 162; Pawling v. Wilson, 13 Johns. 192;
Coehran v. Fitch, 1 Sandf. Ch. 142; Chiamberlain v. Farris,1
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Mo. 517; Kibbe v. Kibbe, Kirby 119; the presence of property being no ground for founding jurisdiction over the person: Story's Conflict of Laws, § 549; NM Vicker v. Beeby, 31
Maine 814.
In actions for partition, foreclosure of mortgages, and the
enforcement of liens and demands against property, the manifest
injustice of withholding all legal remedy from those interested in,
or against the property, for the reason that others who are interested with them are not inhabitants of the country or cannot be
found therein, is a sufficient excuse for a resort to constructive
service of process. In the enactment of laws upon this subject,
injustice has been done only by extending the jurisdiction of
courts to a class of cases in which it cannot be sustained under
the laws of nations. This brings us to a consideration of that
class, which will be found embracing nearly every description
of proceeeings in fpersonam.
There is one exception to the general principle here advocated,
which is now acquiesced in by the best authorities. Reference is
had to proceedings in divorce. If one of the parties is an inhabitant of the territory of the forum, suit may be instituted and
decree rendered upon constructive notice, although the other
party. may never have been amenable to the jurisdiction by
presence or inhabitation: 2 Bishop M. & D. 141. This exception rests upon grounds peculiar to the nature of the action. The
state, being interested in every marriage contract which imposes
upon its citizens a status in life, assumes the right to change and
modify that status whenever the public good demands it. And
this right, unless exercised unjustly, will be conceded by all
foreign governments.
In all other actions in personam the authorities concur in
denying all jurisdiction whatever over non-resident foreigners,
upon anything short of actual notice given within the territorial
limits of the forum, or voluntary appearance there.'. It may be
I D'Arcy v. Ketchum, 11 How. U. S. 165 ; Buchanan v. Rucker, 9 East 192 ;
Steel v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447 ; Miller v. Miller, 1 Bailey 242 ; Sallee v. Hays, 3
Mo. 116; Gillett v. Camp, 23 Mo. 375; Williams v. Preston, 3 J. J. Marsh. 600;
Cobb v. Haynes, 8 B. Monroe 139 ; -Whitixg v. Johnson, 5 Dana 392; Harrisv.
John, 6 J. J. Marsh. 257 ; Buttrick v. Allen, 8 Mass. 273; Bissell V. Briggs, 9
Mass. 462; Phelps v. Brewer, 9 Cush. 390; Hall v. 'illiams, 6 Pick. 232; Warren v. McCarthy et al., 25 Ill. 94; Sim v. Jrank, 25 Id. 125; Harrod v. Barreto,
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remarked that aL-k
delivei'y of notice to the non-resident outside
the territory of the forum, will be regarded in no mre favorable
a light than notice by publication: DEer v. Coffi, 1 Cush. 23
.'ike v. Anderson, 33 fBarb. 71. It will be seen from the citati,ni of authorities that the question here discussed has been before
the United 6tates Supreme Court. In the case (.f I'Ar-,j v.
li7 tlatf, 11 How. U. S. 165, itappeared that a judgment had
been rendered in the state of New York in favor of Ketchum
against Goss*p and D'Arcy upon a partnership note of theirs.
There was personal service on Gossip, and no service on D'Arey,
who was an inhabitant of Louisiana. Judgmnt was rendered
against him in accordance with a New York statute, which provided that where joint debtors were sued, and one of them was
brought into court, judgment should go against the others in like
manner as if they were served with process, the service of process
upon one being regarded as constructive service upon the rest.
An action upon this judgment was brought in the Circuit Court
of the United States against D'Arcy. The court held, that,
under the Act of May 26th 1790, the record was entitled to full
faith and credit, and gave judgment accordingly. This judgment
of the Circuit Court was reversed in the Supreme Court on appeal,
where it was held that the courts of New York acquired no jurisdiction over D'Arcy; and that not being a citizen or inhabitant
of that state, lie could not be affected by laws to which lie was
not amenable.
Judgments upon constructive service of process against citizens
temporarily absent from their country, are supposed to rest upon
a different principle. It is maintained by some that every citizen
is amenable to the laws of his country vherever lie may be. In
respect to judgments from countries wholly foreign to us, no wellf6unded reason for a departure from the general principle can be
perceived. For although it is true that each sovereiguty may
provide any mode of service of process it chooses, which will be
I Hall 155 ; Smith v. &afth, 17 Ill. 482 : P,'mowr.ov.Jlbr)u:tn, 23 How. U. S. 1-32;
t
.hm~may v. Sillmtnn, 6 Wend. 447 ; Bissl v.
!elock,
11 Cut-h. 277 ; Ilfpkirk
v. Bridgies, 4 H-en. &-M. 413; Int
v. JoLson. Freeman's Cit. 282; J,ltrioenY.
THrton, 11 Vt. 425 ; Adams v. Lamar, 8 Ga. 83; li'hel1 v. hIrt~eer, IIN. H.
299 ; IBter v. Glazener, 27 Ala. 391 ; Lo-'ja
1 v. Albee, 3,3'Me. 415 ; 3iidade v.
Rlehodes, 4 Dana 144; Miller v. Sharp, 3 Rand. 41 ; . enlore -. 0ut1,2 Me1ullcn 162; PttH ,ft v..Mofield, 10 La. 220.
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obligatory in its own courts, yet inasmuch as foreign judgments
have no extra-territorial force except what is yielded to them by
the comity of nations, the courts, guided by the reason and justice
of that comity, have invariably withheld their approval from all
judicial proceedings which could be shown to be against reason
and justice: 2 Kent Com. 120. And the act of entering up a
judgment against a person, wh9 has no actual notice of the proceeding against him, is so revolting to the common sense and
perception of justice as to constitute the plea of it a good defence
whenever made out, notwithstanding the practice may have been
in strict conformity with the laws of the sovereignty to which the
defendant owed his allegiance.
But where such a record comes from a sister state, a difficulty
is presented in sustaining the plea which is not so easily overcome.
In the Act of Congress of May 26th 1790, it is provided that the
records of the different states "shall have such faith and credit
given to them in every court within the United States, as they
have by law or usage'in the courts of the state from which they
are or shall be taken." If judgments are rendered upon service
of process by publication in the state of Calif6rnia against her
own citizens, why -shall they not have the same faith and credit
in the courts of other states that is given to them at home ? In
almost all the cases upon the subject, the defendant has sought to
impeach the record on the ground that he was not a resident of
the territory of the forum or amenable to its laws; and in not a
few his plea has been sustained upon this ground alone, the courts
intimating that 'if he had been a citizen or inhabitant of the territory of the forum, the judgment upon constructive notice would
be valid as against him: Bimeler v. IDawson, 4 Scam. 536;
Smith v. Smith, 17 Ill. 482; Sim v. -Frank, 25- Ill. 125;
ea a v. fattoon, 13 Pick. 53; Green v. Sarmiento, 1 Peters
C. C. 74. The light in which the English courts have regarded
judgments upon constructive notice in some of their subject provinces would seem to support this view: Diouglass v. Forrest,4
Bing. 686; Bequet v. AMCarty, 2 Barn. & Ad. 951; Smith v.
Nicolls, 5 Bing. N. C. 208. If any difference of treatment is t
be observed towards the judgments from sister states, it must be
considered as imposed by the Act of Congress to which we have
referred. If that act was again open to construction, it might be
thought difficult to escape the conclusion intimated in Bimeler v.
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Dawson. But after an extended controversy it is now settled
that the judgments of sister states under the Act of Congress of
1790 shall have full faith and credit as domestic judgments:
Mills v. D)o'yee, T Cranch 48; ianmton v. McComiell, 3'
Wheat. 234; except where they have been fraudulently obtained,
or where the courts rendering them had no jurisdiction of the
subject-matter or parties: Bissell v. Briggs, 9 Mass.; Stuinway
v. stilllnan, 4 Cow. 292 ; D'Arey v. Ketchum, 11 How. U. S.
165.
Now if our courts are justified under the Act of 1790, in withholding full faith and credit from the record of a judgment of a
sister state, against a non-resident foreigner, upon service of process by publication, as seems to be well established, they are
equally justified under that act in ignoring the validity of a record
upon similar service of process against a citizen of the state temporarily absent but still amenable to her laws ; for the reason that
in said state the two judgments have the same force and validity,
no distinction being made between foreigners and citizens. The
embarrassment arising from the Act of 1790 being removed by
the decisions of the Supreme Court-in the case of judgments
against non-resident foreigners, and the question of jurisdiction
being thus thrown open to inquiry, the courts are at liberty to
govern their conduct upon the subject, by the principles of international law, and declare in all suits on foreign judgments,
whether rendered against non-residents or citizens of. the forum,
what constitutes sufficient jurisdiction to support a judgment,
which shall command the faith and respect of all tribunals. It
is a question of record or no record. If the defendant had no
actual notice of the proceedings, the record of them is a nullity
as against him, and does not comply with the definition of a
judicial record within the meaning and intent of the Act of Congress of 1790: Thurber v. Blackburne, I N. H. 242; Holt v.
Alloway, 2 Blackf. 108. It matters not how it may be regarded,
or what it may be denominated, at home. The general understanding of the essential requisites of a record, under the laws
of nations, and which is the one undoubtedly embraced in the
Act of 1790, cannot be changed or modified by the laws and
regulations of the states. This will be the conclusion reached by
all the courts when the proper cases shall arise. In the case of
Webster v. Reid, 11 How. 437, Justice MCLEAx accepts it with-
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out any qualification. It appeared in that case, that the legislature of Iowa by special statute authorized suits in personam
against "owners of the half-breed lands" lying in Lee county.
It was provided that service of process should be effected by
publication in the newspapers. Their lands were seized and sold
under judgments rendered in accordance with this statute, and
the question about their validity rose in a controversy upon the
title to the lands. Justice McLEAN in the decision uses the
following language: "These suits were not a proceeding in remagainst the land, but were in personam against the owners of it.
-hether they all resided within the territory or not does not
appear, nor is it a matter of any importance. No person is
required to answer in a suit on whom process has not been served,
or whose property has not been attached. In this case there was
no personal notice, nor attachment or other proceeding against
the land until after the judgments. The judgments, therefore,
are nullities, and did not authorize the executions on which the
land was sold."
In some states the fact that the defendant has absconded from
his usual place of abode, or conceals himself, with a design to
evade process, is made a ground of entertaining jurisdiction over
him upon constructive notice. This it seems to us is equally,
objectionable, as in cases where he is temporarily absent, or cannot be found. For a court to enter judgment against a person,
as if he was present submitting to its jurisdiction, when from the
record itself it appears that he is not only not in court but cannot
be brought in, it presents such a contradiction on the face of the
record as ill becomes the truth and solemnity which has always
been accorded to judicial proceedings. Such facts when proved
might be a good ground of proceeding against the property of the
fugitive by attachment; or by confiscation as in outlawry at
common law. But an attempt to extend a jurisdiction over his
person, for the reason that he puts himself beyond the territory
or process of the court, only tends to produce a confusion in the
general understanding of the object and province of courts of
justice.
Strictly speaking there is no personal service, except that of
reading or delivering the writ or notice to the defendant. Where
the recitals of the record disclose this mode of service, they have
been held conclusive upon the parties, by some of the highest
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authorities: Binteler v. Dawson, 4 Scam. 536; Teseott v.
Brown, 13 Ind. 83; -Pritchettv. Clark, 5 Har. (Del.) 63;
Field v. Gibbs, Peters C. 0. 155 ; Boberts v. Caldwell, 5 Dana
512 ; Wilcox v. Kassick, 2 Mich. 165 ; but the decision of Judge
MARCY in Starbuck v. 3t
lrray,5 Wend. 148, against this position
is unanswerable. The weight of authority at present concedes
only the force of prirndfacie evidence to such recitals, and allows
the defendant to contradict them by parol testimony: Long v.
Long, 1 Hill 597; Norwood v. Cobb, 15 Tex. 500. This was
the conclusion reached by Chief Justice SHAw in the case of
Carleton v. Biccford, 13 Gray 591.
Service of process may be effected under the laws of many of
the states by leaving a copy of the writ or notice at the usual
place of abode of the defendant. A recital of such service is
yrimd facie evidence of the court having jurisdiction over him:
Tullerton v. Horton, 11 Yt. 425. The burden of disproving it
rests with him. This is equally true with recitals of voluntary
appearance by defendant: Gleason v. -Dodd,4 M
Ietc. 333; or of
his appearance by attorney: .Plielps v. Brewer, 9 Cush. 390;
Sherrard v. Nevins, 2 Ind. 241 ; Aldrich v. Kinney, 4 Conn.
380. A distinction has been taken in the courts of Missouri
which excludes the defendant from contradicting the recitals or
proof of appearance by attorney, if those recitals are conclusive
in the state from which the record comes: Warren v. Lusk, 16
Mo. 102. In the case of Warren v. !Lusk the court held the
recital of appearance by attorney in a record from the state of
Illinois, -was conclusive under the Act of Congress of 1790. In
reaching this conclusion the court adhered to the old English
doctrine upon the conclusiveness of such a recital in a domestic
judgment, and then presumed that in the absence of proof the
law of Illinois corresponded with that of Missouri, which would
make it conclusive at home and therefore conclusive abroad.
The error committed by the court was in yielding to the old doctrine in relation to such a recital in a domestic judgment, as
opposed to the more just. and reasonable one which is fast being
adopted in modern times, and which regards such a recital only
nridud facie evidence of jurisdiction: 5 Am. Law Reg., N. S.
(May 1866), 387 ; Shelton v. Tilin, 6 How. U. S. 163; hrsh,,, v. Blackman, 19 Iowa 101.
A return or recital of service of process by publication in a
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foreign record is not even primd facie evidence of jurisdiction
(Steel v. Smith, 7 W. & S. 447; Winston v. Taylor, 28 Mo. 82;
Aradt v. Aradt, 15 0. 33;
eTVicker v. Beeby, 31 Maine 316;
Bicknell v. Field,8 Paige 440), as against citizens and residents
of other states. If a record does not show jurisdiction as to the
parties upon its face, it cannot be aided by proof of such fact.
aliunde: Noyes v. Butler, 6 Barb. 613.
A reflection may be added -in closing this discussion. If it is
the will of the law-making power of a state that all manner of
judgments should be rendered against non-residents and absentees
upon constructive service of process, such as publication, there
would seem to be no power in the courts of that state to refuse
obedience. It could hardly be shown that such a law was in violation of the Federal Constitution, and the couits would not be
justified in declaring it void as opposed to natural justice or the
principles of international law. "Considerations of this sort belong
exclusively to the legislative department, and afford no aid to the
courts in opposing the ascertained will of the state. It is only
when the records come before foreign tribunals that the questions
rise which are here discussed. The same principles which govern
them in passing upon the validity of such records, should be the
guide of the legislature of each state in conferring authority upon.
its courts. It is to be regretted that such has not always been
the case, and that our courts are called upon so often to withhold
their approval from the records of judicial proceedings in sister
states, for the reason that they do not conform to the requirements
of an enlightened jurisprudence.i
A. M.
1 In the recent revision of the statutes of Missouri, this subject has been placed
upon grounds eminently rational and just. Orders of publication are granted "in
suits in partition, divorce, attachment, and for the foreclosure of mortgages and
deeds of trust, and for the enforcement of mechanics' liens and all other liens
against either real or personal property, and in all actions at law or in equity which
have for their immediate object the enforcement or establishment of any lawful
right, claim, or demand to or against any real or personal property within the jurisdiction of the court: Rev. Stats. Mo., p. 655 (1865).

